
















Even in the context of a relatively flourishing state, fragility can be an enduring feature of a 
political system, particularly in the case of recently established or unrecognised states. This 
article examines the nature of statebuilding in a specific context to question the assumption 
that forms of hybrid governance or pre-existing forms of governance are a necessary evil be 
tolerated but which needs ultimately to be overcome during statebuilding. It does this by 
adopting the language of resilience and focusing on the case of Somaliland to highlight the 
role of clan governance as a mechanism of political resilience and as a means of promoting 
the flexibility required for statebuilding. Yet, at the same time, the process of statebuilding 
often involves formalising governance and limiting the role of traditional social-political 
forms of governance such as clans, ignoring their role in legitimating and stabilizing the 
political system. However, as this article argues, stability and fragility are inextricably linked; 
while the clan system has been an important force in stabilizing the state, it has also become a 
pressure point for the state's latent fragility. By contextualising fragility and stability within 
the language of resilience, though, this symbiotic relationship can be better analysed. 






Fragility within Stability: The State, the Clan and Political Resilience in Somaliland 
 
Since its 1991 declaration of independence, Somaliland has functioned as an unrecognised 
state, balancing demands of international expectations of statehood with domestic necessities 
for provision and stability. A multitude of factors, influences, actors and even motivations 
have contributed to enabling and fostering stability throughout the turbulent processes of 
post-conflict reconciliation and statebuilding. Somaliland’s stability has been accomplished 
within a relatively short period of time and, importantly, with very little involvement of or 
interference by actors external to the Somaliland community. However, as a political entity 
not protected or legitimised by sovereign recognition and thus without the benefits that 
affords, Somaliland is under constant threat of precarity, if not in a constant state of fragility. 
Although a relatively flourishing entity, Somaliland is threatened by factors that stem from its 
self-led statebuilding process. Indeed, whilst also facing threats from environmental factors 
and regional occurrences, the biggest continuing threat to Somaliland is breakdown in the 
political process and in the relationship between social and political institutions. Because of 
the web of social, economic and political forces and motivations maintaining the stability 
necessary for vital political growth and economic development, an inherent fragility exists. 
However, there are points of continuity and resilience within the Somaliland project which 
act to balance the inextricable link between fragility and stability.  
 
Drawing on observational research, government and civil society interviews in Somaliland, 
and ideational work drawn from intellectual themes apparent from those, this article 
examines statebuilding in Somaliland through the lens of resilience in analysing the role of 
traditional governance institutions as a mechanism of resilience. Statebuilding here is defined 
as ‘the creation or recovery of the authoritative, legitimate, and capable governance 
institutions that can provide for security and the necessary rule-of-law conditions for 
economic and social development’.1 Successful statebuilding demands often drastic socio-
political change, and within this, but often lacking explicit recognition within practice, is the 
need for legitimacy and societal acceptance of new governance mechanisms and 
relationships. More critically, statebuilding is a political-legal process concerned with 
formalism over informalism that in practice, as Richmond notes, ‘is shorn of its historical and 
 




social context, re-established as a procedural infrastructure, representing best practice and 
good governance, via an ideological preference for a certain form of state’.2 This is not to be 
confused with state formation, which historically is a more organic, and lengthy, process 
centred on the establishment of a social contract. Indeed, in modern statebuilding, the social 
contract is assumed as an end result, rather than the starting point of the process of creating 
the state.  
 
When analysing statebuilding processes, the lens of resilience, specifically political 
resilience, opens scope for questioning statebuilding differently. Rather than focusing on 
success at achieving a pre-determined end, it better allows for questioning what makes 
governance and the state work and survive, and enhances understanding of how statebuilding 
takes place rather than assessing against assumptions about how it should take place. It forces 
inclusion of examining the interplay between actors, processes and mechanisms in achieving 
stability. This article begins to conceptualise political resilience, framing it within the context 
of socio-political relationships that characterise the state and underpin statebuilding.  
 
Somaliland’s government and governance are characterised by hybridity, with democratic 
structures and practices emerging from and alongside clan governance practices and 
institutions. Often seen as illiberal or deviant, hybrid governance continues to be perceived of 
a necessary evil rather than an acceptable condition; it is a means to an acceptably liberal end 
where a conditional acceptance of value continues to problematize domestic, particularly 
traditional or customary, mechanisms of governance as points of insecurity that must be 
eventually fixed.3 The argument here rejects this premise in highlighting the role of clan 
governance in enabling the flexibility required to facilitate and maintain the ongoing 
statebuilding process in Somaliland. However, although a factor that also allows for 
considerable flexibility, in Somaliland the ‘traditional’ is also a point of fragility. As a result, 
a complex web of intertwined forces create stability but at the same time also threaten it. 
Thus, as this article concludes, clan governance, as a mechanism of resilience, is also a 
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Political development and governance are typically discussed in terms of strength and 
stability. Almost always addressed in linear terms, states are placed along a spectrum 
between fragility and stability, with a calculation of a number of set indicators used to assess 
level of strength. Some measures quantify these criteria, providing numerical scores for the 
supposed stability (or fragility) of individual states. Whilst these mechanisms can be useful 
for providing a broad picture and identifying potential conflict, they are problematic when 
looking beyond the expected liberal democratic style of state and, ultimately, of governance.4 
Further, the terms ‘strength’ and ‘stability’ denote rigidity, a connotation that carries weight 
in both perception and practice. The rigid frameworks that are established and the set 
expectations and measured criteria of assessment guide practice, including statebuilding. 
Because stability and fragility are opposite ends of the spectrum, it is difficult to then open 
understanding and practice to the potential co-existence of the two. Here, rigidity is a 
problem. 
 
However, the conceptual lexicon of the social sciences disciplines has a term that may be 
more appropriate to use: resilience. Resilience is a contested yet malleable term that has 
cross-disciplinary applications. At its most basic definition, resilience means to ‘bounce 
back,’ and is ‘often applied in relation to an entity or system’s ability to return to normal 
functioning quickly following a disturbance’.5 There is a presumption of an underlying 
equilibrium, meaning the identification of a base is required in order to assess, or even 
discuss, resilience. Further understandings of resilience push the concept into the realm of 
adapting or learning in order to persist or survive.6 Here, building resilience is proactive, 
focusing on mitigating risk by strengthening capacity to protect against the ‘possible 
consequences of disruptions to society’ that may occur due to a potentially disruptive 
occurrence or action.7 To some extent, this removes the assumption of normality or 
equilibrium, and instead places resilience within the context of change or adaptation.  
 
Still, though, it is easy to place ideologically loaded assumptions into the understanding of 
‘beneficial’ change, or to direct what type of adaptation is necessary. The literature on 
 
4 For discussion on security and peace, see Richmond, “Decolonising”. 
5 Klein, et al, “Resilience”; Prior and Hagmann, “Measuring,” 282. 





resilience is dominated by discussions of resilience within physical or social systems or 
infrastructure – health systems, education, roads, communications and environment are 
common topics. Within these, it is common to find critiques of ideological assumptions 
embedded within expectations and practice.8 Resilience is seen as designed and constructed 
rather than natural, carrying with it assumptions that the design is external, to be adopted and 
enacted by internal actors. In this regard resilience is a form of intervention that emphasises 
the need to create in order to foster change, with ‘existing resilience factors’9 empowered, but 
with limited agency because of the constraints of intervention. As Chandler notes, resilience 
is a ‘heuristic device, drawing attention to a particular governing rationality informing 
statebuilding policy prescriptions which work on the relational shaping of societal 
understandings and responses’.10 It is an ‘ideological understanding of the limits of’ liberal 
interventionism and the failures of domestic societies that ‘produce the barriers to sustainable 
peace and development’11. Viewing these barriers as reproductive and therefore perpetually 
self-harming, building resilience thus focuses on changing practice from within in order to 
‘teach’ domestic actors12 the behaviours that will allow them to ‘break out of the reproduction 
of the problems or “traps”’ that hinder liberal development and thus peace.13 In this way, 
building resilience is conceptualised as another mechanism of liberal governance through 
which life in the Global South is controlled or biopolitically governed.14 
 
As a tool of stability and development policies and a topic of academic study, the discourse 
surrounding resilience highlights and maintains an external view of domestic power. This 
continues to problematize individualities by identifying and highlighting deviance from the 
liberal norm and expectations; deviance which is deemed a ‘risk’ or a ‘threat,’ despite its 
potential centrality and importance in domestic socio-political relationships. Critical 
understandings of resilience therefore must move beyond critiquing the liberal and must 
focus attention on what socio-political interrelations offer. In other words, reclaiming the 
concept of resilience by looking within rather than seeking to create a pre-determined end 
offers a useful analytical tool for understanding the complexity of socio-political structures 
 
8 See Chandler, “International”; Joseph, “Resilience”. 
9 Manyena and Gordon, Bridging, 38. 
10 Chandler, “International,” 278. 
11 Chandler, “International,” 277. 
12 Finnemore, National. 
13 Chandler, “International,” 277; Joseph, “Resilience”; Zebrowski, “Nature”.  




and relationships within states; understanding that is necessary for the desired sustainability 
and stability of the built state. ‘Building resilience,’ therefore, must not only identify pre-
existing factors, but must recognise their value for their agency and their capacity within 
socio-political power. Resilience of socio-political structures and relationships – political 
resilience - must be a central consideration in statebuilding. 
 
Resilience in the context of statebuilding is currently limited to considerations such as 
capacity building or systems like healthcare, infrastructure or education. Likely because of 
the dominance of the language of stability and fragility, resilience is not discussed in the 
context of political systems or governance. Removed from the confines of liberal 
interventionism, an understanding of resilience as adaptation or learning, as well as of 
‘springing back’ is useful in the context of statebuilding in that it allows for a recognition of 
necessary flexibility within a disruptive process.15 Flipping our thinking on resilience from 
external liberal guidelines to internal functioning allows us to remove expectations of 
external design and create a more inclusive approach to understanding and analysing. This 
shift allows for a recognition of firstly, non-western, or even non-democratic, mechanisms of 
governance; and secondly, variations in how governance is formed, structured or enacted: an 
understanding focused on what the domestic offers rather than what the domestic lacks.16 The 
use of resilience allows us to see beyond the linear and to recognise flux, change, learning, 
and adaptation that is part of the process of building, and strengthening, a lasting system of 
governance and government. To get to the point of lasting, though, often involves, or should 
involve, trial and error which itself means continuous change. A resilient state is one that can 
change, learn and adapt in order to be able to ‘bounce back’ to a point of relative peace and 
stability that is required for the process to continue: it is flexible, not rigid. It is here that the 
point of equilibrium becomes relevant as a point of continuity and thus stabilisation.17 
Political resilience is not the opposite of fragility, but it is what helps hold fragility at bay.  
 
THE CLAN IN SOMALILAND 
The nearly decade long Somalia civil war was fought by numerous liberation movements 
against forces loyal to dictator Siad Barre. In February 1991, Barre’s forces in Somaliland 
 
15 Richards and Smith, “Playing”  
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were defeated by the Somali National Movement (SNM), a liberation group rooted in the 
dominant Isaaq clan that advocated for a federal democratic government for Somalia. 
Throughout its existence, the leadership of the SNM recognised the importance of the 
pervasive Somali clan as a mechanism of governance and utilised them, specifically the 
elders, as a political and strategic tool to garner support during the war. This utilisation and 
integration of the clan proved indispensable for the SNM during the war and for the political 
leaders who embarked on the process of creating a Somaliland state following its May 1991 
declaration of independence from Somalia.  
 
The complex Somali clan system provides identification, protection and governance in 
Somaliland society. Kinship is a ‘critical source of an individual’s identity’18 and clan 
allegiance and dependence is regarded by many as part of being Somali. There are six main 
structuring clan-families that are then further divided into numerous clans, sub-clans, sub-sub 
clans, primary lineage groups, and diya-paying groups.19 Although clan distribution has 
altered drastically in the last century, in Somaliland the majority of the population come from 
one of three main clan-families: Isaaq, Dir, and Darood. The Isaaq is the most populous 
group in Somaliland, with some estimates placing it as high as eighty percent of the total 
population.20 The Somali clans and sub-clans serve an important function in Somali society, 
particularly in the nomadic communities. Established as a means of governance in the 
primarily nomadic and non-centralised pre-colonial Somali society, the clan continues to 
influence a person’s place within society and the economy, as well as in determining relations 
between members of competing or allied clan-families. As clan-families are too big to act as 
collective political units, division into smaller clan and sub-clan groupings allows for better 
geographic, political, economic and social distinction and therefore more comprehensive 
control and protection.21 In this, the clan ‘represents the social divisions of people into 
corporate political groups...By virtue of genealogy of birth, each individual has an exact place 
in society’.22 The clan further provides what Drysdale labels the Somali ‘insurance policy’ as 
clans take collective responsibility for their members, their losses and their security.23 Some 
have argued that increased attachment to other social groups or to territory as well as the 
 
18 Bradbury, Becoming, 18. 
19 Lewis, Modern. 
20 Bradbury, Becoming, 52. 
21 Lewis, Pastoral. 
22 Ibid, 1–2. 




emergence of a state, urbanisation, migration and the impacts of colonial or government 
policies, have altered and lessened the impact of the clan system. Whereas this can certainly 
be seen, especially in the South, in Somaliland colonial practices and post-independence 
isolation led to less disruption to the clan system and to more societal dependence upon clan 
provision and protection. Increasing pressure to lessen the impact of the clan, especially in 
political space, is found primarily in urban areas and amongst the younger generations, but, 
as Bradbury notes, ‘the clan system remains an important feature of Somali social, political 
and economic life’ in Somaliland.24 In Somaliland’s hybrid system, the clan sits not only 
within the government, but also external to it as a pervasive mechanism of governance that 
serves to ‘hold[ing] the “traditions”’ of the clan at all levels.25 
  
In Somaliland there has been continuity in the clan governance system that does not exist in 
other Somali inhabited territories.26 Throughout the Somalia civil war the clan was utilised by 
the SNM to foster support for the movement, creating what would be the permanent 
institutionalisation of the clan governance. Although rooted in political idealism and what 
could be described as a form of nationalism, the SNM’s recognition of the importance and 
centrality of the clan to governance and government paved the way for its inclusion in the 
central governing structures of the emerging Somaliland state. Following the declaration of 
independence and throughout the initial period of statebuilding, the clan was central to the 
process,27 and symbolically the authority of the Somaliland government came from the clans 
as the elders absorbed authority from the SNM and then bestowed it upon the Somaliland 
government.  
 
STABILITY AND FRAGILITY OF SOMALILAND 
The road to peace in Somaliland was not bloodless, and the end of the war brought retributive 
acts against those who had supported Barre or were in opposition to the SNM. However, 
violence was kept to a minimum, largely because of the SNM’s immediate reconciliation 
actions, particularly in allowing for a process led by clan elders rather than asserting its 
authority through force. The SNM’s grassroots peacebuilding actions and its policy of 
peaceful co-existence amongst the clans facilitated an environment that was relatively 
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stable.28 This top-down yet at the same time bottom-up road to peace and reconstruction was 
characterised by a succession of clan-led national and sub-national reconciliation conferences 
that provided a forum for reconciliation and which laid the foundations for statebuilding in 
Somaliland, with the first taking place in Berbera in February 1991.29As shir – ad hoc 
community councils used as mechanisms of governance within and between clans – these 
foundational gatherings brought together social and political actors to begin the processes of 
reconciliation and negotiating the state.30 Used as a means through which the Somaliland 
population could come together through clan and community representatives, these 
conferences were vital for reconciliation purposes in a war-torn society, and in reaching and 
relaying a consensus on the future of the territory and its eventual system of government.  
 
The SNM had always advocated that the clan could not be ignored and thus the primary 
intention of the SNM leadership and subsequent government leaders was to create a state and 
a government rooted in the clan. A transitional government was appointed by the SNM’s 
council of elders (guurti), who then became members of the new government themselves, 
institutionalised as the Upper House of Parliament (Golaha Guurtida, or Guurti). Clan elders 
hold a large amount of influence in Somali society, including as mediators and peacemakers 
in the resolution of inter and intra-clan conflict and disputes.31 Guurti have historically been 
ad hoc bodies, convened when necessary. Often sitting within shir, guurti are the highest 
form of political authority within a non-hierarchical clan system. Seen as a key to stability, 
the continuation of the centrality of elders from SNM to reconciliation and statebuilding 
government facilitated the environment necessary for the implementation of drastic reform 
and the creation of the new government.  
 
The structure of the hybrid Somaliland government is a multi-party presidential system with a 
bicameral legislature and what is meant to be an independent judiciary, although it is widely 
acknowledged that judicial reform is needed. Somaliland’s government was first codified in 
1993 with a provisional National Charter, a clan agreement that bound the clans and the state 
together through customary law. This was replaced by the Somaliland Constitution in 2001. 
Local officials, the president and the Lower House of Parliament are democratically elected, 
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and the judiciary is appointed. Members of the Upper House of Parliament are selected by 
clans, with all Somaliland clans and sub-clans represented, although constitutional ambiguity 
regarding how the membership is determined has posed problems and brought about calls for 
reform.32 Multi-party elections have been deemed free and fair by international observers and 
peaceful transfers of power have taken place, including transfers between competing political 
parties in 2005 (Lower House of Parliament) and 2010 (President). The current legal system 
in Somaliland is a hybrid of codified secular laws, shari’a law and uncodified customary law 
(xeer) that is comprised of both historic and new inter and intra-clan agreements and 
settlements. The practice of parallel legal systems reflects, in part, the historical evolution of 
legal and judicial systems in Somaliland.33 The central courts are weak and underdeveloped, 
and much of the everyday justice and system and reconciliation mechanisms remain with the 
clans and within the clan system.34 
 
Still undergoing consolidation of evolving political settlements, the project and statebuilding 
process in Somaliland are relatively new and are incomplete. Whilst the government itself is 
weak, it exists not despite opposition, but largely because of it. Political opposition has been 
accepted within Somaliland, and negotiating solutions to obstacles or addressing oppositional 
challenges has become a feature of the forming Somaliland government. Indeed, Somaliland 
is negotiating a government, and a state, as much as it is building one.35  
 
Arguably in Somaliland the state is a political process rather than a governing entity, with the 
government as the tangible reflection of this. Indeed, the state in Somaliland is a complexity 
of motivations and ideas embodied by the institutions, symbolic of not only the process but 
also expectations and desires. Much of what is driving the Somaliland process is a desire for 
peace and stability, but also to be legally separate from the south. The former is self-
explanatory, but is also seen by many as a condition for the latter. The realisation of 
independence depends on international recognition of sovereignty, the circular dependence 
between domestic stability and external recognition underpins many of the political processes 
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and actions in Somaliland today, including the maintenance of peace and the style and 
functions of the government.36  
  
Despite its weakness, the stability of the government is seen as vital to survival, or even birth, 
of the state. It is robust because of its place within the Somaliland project and the flexibility 
afforded to it by the statebuilding process, but it is also fragile because of its precarious 
position within a more than 20-year project that has yet to fulfil the promise of sovereignty. 
Indeed, it is the possibility, or the impossibility, of the idea of an independent state becoming 
reality that is the biggest point of fragility for Somaliland. Because of this, for continued 
stability in the face of fragility it is vital that the domestic sovereignty, as well as the 
legitimacy underpinning that, do not rest solely with the government.  
 
The dynamism of Somaliland politics and society means that the state is constantly adapting 
to changing circumstances. Statebuilding has not been unproblematic, with numerous crisis 
points that could have derailed the process. However, the process has been resilient. There 
are mechanisms and socio-political factors that have facilitated this within Somaliland. 
Motivations for recognition, desire for political change, rhetoric, invocations of collective 
memory and narratives of statehood are amongst the intangible in the complex web of 
political space in Somaliland. Amongst the tangible, though, one key factor stands out 
amongst a broad range of political actors: the inclusion of traditional clan mechanisms, both 
practically and symbolically, in governance and the government. The clan, as a socio-
political institution that sits both within and above the government, contributes to the 
strengthening of legitimacy, whilst at the same time also threatening it.  
 
The structure of the state utilises pre-existing and trusted power mechanisms that have 
assisted with creating the flexibility and adaptability necessary for political change to 
proceed. Although limited by structural constraints and changing political culture,37 clan 
institutions have provided continuity of governance and of a socio-political link, both of 
which have been key aspects of stability and equilibrium. This adaptability creates risk and 
fragility but at the same time also creates a point of resilience. Three primary areas where this 
can be identified are governance, law and justice, and conflict resolution.  
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Somali pastoralist society was governed through ‘ordered anarchy,’ not constituted on central 
institutional rule but also not without governance or rules.38 Its egalitarian and openly 
participatory nature maintained order through what Bradbury identifies as ‘collective social 
institutions and through reciprocal, rule-bound behaviour delineated in customary law’.39 
Shir, and within that guurti, were convened when need determined, and it was during these 
that clan or sub-clan affairs were managed, conflicts were resolved, and the balance between 
the clans and sub-clans was maintained, providing a ‘structure for inter-group relations and 
governance [and] for organizing and managing violence’.40 With clan elders being the most 
respected men and societal peacekeepers, decisions made by the guurti were binding 
customary law that were passed down through the generations, creating a legal system and 
governance structure.41  
 
The continued existence of these councils and customary law have been instrumental in the 
post-conflict reconciliation and statebuilding processes, and thus political resilience, in 
Somaliland. With layers of clan governance and central government existing both separately 
and in tandem, the clan is an agent of governance and provision, filling the ‘governance gap’ 
where the central government is weak and contributing to the governance necessary for 
peaceful co-existence within society at the sub-state and central levels.42 Although 
undeniably altered through its political institutionalisation, the Somaliland House of Elders is 
a powerful symbolic reminder of these traditional councils as well as a practical inclusion of 
clan governance in the central government. The system is not perfect, and not all clans fully 
support the current form or functions of the government.43 Further, some of the biggest 
threats to Somaliland’s stability stem from grievances of some of the clans, particularly those 
in the eastern provinces. However, the intertwining of clan governance and central 
democratic government in the overall provision of governance in Somaliland is a striking 
feature of not only the government but also governance and the political resilience of 
Somaliland.  
 
38 Lewis, Pastoral. 
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40 Ibid., 15. 
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As a mechanism of resilience, the inclusion of the clan has facilitated flexibility44 and 
continuity that was necessary to maintain societal investment in the process. During the initial 
stages of statebuilding the clan served as a tempering link; it helped bridge the gap between 
the ‘old’ and ‘new’ forms of governance and between the government and the population.45 
In the government, the House of Elders was inextricably linked to both the state and the 
people through the common denominator of the clan, putting it in a position where it was 
both part of and outside or above the state, ‘hold[ing] together the government, society and 
culture’.46 Even though the traditional council of elders has been altered to fit its 
contemporary institutionalised role, the trusted clan association in the Upper House was 
significant. Tasked with guidance as well as restraint, the elders became a point of 
reassurance for a population that had very little, if any, experience of democracy and had 
very violent experiences with centralised rule. The inclusion of the clan elders was a vital 
component in a period of drastic change, providing continuity in governance and helping to 
negotiate Somaliland culture and traditions with democracy and the modern state. The Upper 
House helped ease tensions in the transitions and transformations taking place in Somaliland, 
providing a form of safety net that created space for responding to problems, obstacles, crisis 
and change.  Even though in this capacity the role of the clan was largely symbolic, it has 
been an important component of resilience in Somaliland. 
 
As the statebuilding process continues internal dynamics are changing. The House of Elders 
is not nor should be immune from this, and increasingly it finds itself at the centre of calls for 
reform. However, Somaliland’s path to the ‘state’ was self-led and thus responsive to local 
needs, considerations, and demands. Indeed, an advantage of this self-led path created the 
flexibility needed to accommodate the socio-political change that is inevitable within 
statebuilding. The Somaliland state has a significant amount of latitude in the exercise of 
sovereignty, largely stemming from the presence of the clan elders in the government. Most 
importantly, their inclusion created a level of central governance that not only resided within 
the government but also existed despite it, ensuring that during periods of transition or in the 
event of a political crisis central governance would continue to exist through the traditional 
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institution. In its place both within and above the government, internally rather than 
externally rooted sovereignty exercised by the traditional authority is extensible, and 
including this Somali component of governance alongside modern institutions in the central 
government created a safeguard for the forming state. For Somaliland, the utilisation of 
traditional authority was the best, and possibly only, option for the stabilisation of a 
contentious and potentially volatile society during that period of extreme transition and of the 
initial stages of statebuilding that followed. This inclusion of clan governance, both 
practically and symbolically, helped facilitate resilience in Somaliland’s statebuilding 
process. 
 
Law and Justice 
In 1993 Somaliland’s first constitutional documents were established as customary law 
(xeer). Historically and traditionally, the Somaliland clan system has provided a system of 
law and justice through agreements made between clans. Unwritten customary laws (xeer) 
create the ‘lynchpin of orderliness’; handed down orally through the generations, these laws 
bind members of clans and other socio-political groups to the agreements of the previous 
generations, forming a repository of law and practice.47 As customary law, the legal 
foundation of the Somaliland state is not only a form of agreement between the clans, but it is 
also a means through which the clans are bound to the state. This utilisation of the customary 
within the emerging democratic system is a defining characteristic of Somaliland’s hybrid 
legal and judicial systems. 
  
In addition to clans, Somali society is also divided into diya (blood money) groups. These 
groups are a means of policing the clans and enforcing the traditional legal system through 
collective action, creating a ‘self-help’ justice system that ‘provides a sanction against 
violence and reinforces collective responsibility’.48 Together, the clans, diya groups, and xeer 
form the basis of the traditional Somali legal system, functioning in tandem with the formal 
legal institutions.49 Customary law is an accepted and integral component within the state’s 
legal system, and diya groups supplement the still weak justice system. These groups and 
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mechanisms help maintain societal stability by helping to ensure that disputes are resolved 
and extrajudicial retribution is not sought. 
 
Although diya groups and customary law act as important components of the legal and justice 
system, they also play an important role in maintaining a balanced co-existence within and 
between the clans; they are ‘secular lifejackets which keep Somalis afloat irrespective of 
codified systems of governance’.50 As Lewis notes, as the Somali clan system is inherently 
unstable, and because the strong bond of kinship and therefore identity can both unify and 
divide society, the contracts and agreements made between and within the clans ‘cement[s] 
and temporarily stabilize[s] fission and fusion in the lineage system’.51 Customary law 
consists of explicitly formulated obligations, rights and duties, defining basic values and rules 
of behaviour and binding people together in internal and external matters. It is a close 
equivalent to the notion of a social contract. Knowledge of and abidance by these customs 
and laws creates an overarching form of legal governance; the agreements and treaties that 
become customs and laws form stable grounding between the clans, and as society encounters 
new situations and conditions the contracts and customs are revised accordingly. The 
evolution of a ‘common xeer’, built up over centuries of interaction, cooperation and 
competition, and the retention of such values helped in resolving conflicts during the lead-up 
to and following the 1991 collapse of Somalia, and later in establishing peace and a 
government in Somaliland. 52  
  
The role of the clans in law and justice goes beyond this, though. In Somaliland, judicial 
reform is an ongoing political issue. The ‘modern’ Western-style legal system and codified 
laws are underdeveloped and plagued with inefficiency, and judicial independence is an acute 
concern. Alone, the ‘modern’ component of the judicial system is an obstacle to continued 
democratic development.53 However, Somaliland’s legal system is a hybrid one, bringing 
together ‘Western’ institutions with shari’a law and xeer. Where the ‘modern’ is weak or still 
developing, institutions such as xeer and diya groups fill the gaps and serve as a mechanism 
for law and justice. In many ways, forms of legal order are embedded within social 
structures; structures that sit outside the state yet co-existing and reside within the institutions 
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of the state. This socially based legal system forms the bedrock of the ‘day-to-day’ justice 
system in Somaliland. 
 
Somaliland’s legal and judicial development and reform have been slow and both the 
traditional and the modern institutions pose problems for the state. The ‘modern’ institutions 
are weak and, as noted above, lack of judicial independence is a concern. Structural 
advantages of the clan system, specifically related to clan position and strength, creates 
uneven access to justice.54 Contradictions and contestation between the two legal systems 
creates the possibility of what Höhne calls a ‘crippled hybridity,’55 However, statebuilding is 
a process, and in that is the expectation for development and change. In this, the utilisation of 
traditional institutions was a key mechanism for the maintenance of law and justice in the 
absence of ‘modern’ institutions, and arguably facilitated the creation and ongoing 
development of those modern institutions. Customary law underpins the legal foundations of 
the government and the statebuilding process and as such binds state and society, and the 
traditional institutions have allowed for a continuation and balance in the face of a weak or 
absent state. Further, traditional law and justice practices and institutions work as a 
mechanism of conflict prevention and resolution within society. Thus, as a mechanism of 
resilience, clan practices and institutions work to maintain equilibrium, as well as to facilitate 
adaptation and balance. 
 
Conflict Resolution 
In Somali society, co-existence between the clans is a necessary component of peace and 
stability, and Somali society works on a system of ‘balanced opposition between groups…If 
peace is thought to exist where there is an equitable balance, anything which upsets the 
balance will continue conflict’.56 This need for balance means conflict resolution mechanisms 
have become embedded in the clan structure itself; mechanisms such as diya groups for 
lesser, more personal crimes, and clan councils in the instance of inter or intra-clan conflict. 
In some instances smaller conflicts can be resolved through marriage agreements, serving to 
tie two feuding clans or sub-clans through custom.57 Within these mechanisms, clan elders, 
often within guurti, hold primary responsibility for resolving conflicts. For the elders, 
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negotiation and compromise are essential tools and are commonplace in restoring balance and 
resolving conflict. Through the often lengthy, loud and dynamic negotiation process, 
grievances are brought to the attention of all involved and the ‘air is cleared’.58 In 
Somaliland, this subs-state conflict resolution practice creates a foundational mechanism of 
resilience within a political entity that needs to maintain peace whilst undergoing the 
turbulence of statebuilding.  
 
Resolutions to conflicts are typically negotiated by the most respected elders, with the 
agreements becoming xeer. As such, customary law becomes the first route for settling 
disputes and hostilities.59 Elders in Somaliland today list other tools used in their 
peacemaking role: age, shari’a law; proverbs and poems; shir; devotion to the public interest; 
impartiality; using clan resources as an indication of commitment to process; compromise 
and consensus; and persistence. Significantly, the elders also list ‘transparency, fairness, trust 
and sincerity’ as ‘tools for the mutual trust and confidence building’.60 Trust and respect for 
the elders provides the basis for their abilities; without these their actions would be 
meaningless. Because of the intricacies and lasting nature of xeer, clan elders are responsible 
for ensuring that conflicts are resolved as future violations would be subject to diya 
compensation. As such, in places where the clan system remains central to law and 
governance, elders, through conflict resolution mechanisms, provide a point of resilience, 
acting to constantly negotiate balance and co-existence within society.61  
 
This exists on both the local and the national levels. Local mechanisms are more visible and 
tangible acts of resolution that have a more practical every day impact on society. In more 
severe cases of conflict or potential conflict, local actions often also individual members of 
the Upper House of Parliament who represent both the government and the clan and who are 
constitutionally tasked with addressing and resolving conflict in the territory.62 Although at 
the national level this responsibility is much more symbolic than hands on, the presence of 
conflict resolution mechanisms that reside within the traditional body help ensure a systemic 
continuity of peace, and in the event of crisis, provide a means through which equilibrium 
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can once again be found. In that, both levels serve to provide mechanisms of resilience that 
together work to maintain peaceful foundations for the statebuilding process. 
 
Clan conflict resolution mechanisms as points of resilience extend beyond the work of elders. 
The end of the 1994-6 Somaliland civil war, a conflict that arose due to tensions from 
political transition, disputes over power-sharing, control over resources, and divisions within 
the political elite were negotiated largely by professionals from the diaspora using traditional 
mechanisms of conflict resolution.63 The war formally ended following a national 
reconciliation conference, the Hargeisa Conference, which was reminiscent of the early 
statebuilding shir. Although in this instance conflict resolution was not initiated by the clans, 
the utilisation of traditional structures and resolution mechanisms does indicate the 
importance of these clan provisions.  
 
Somaliland has faced intra-governmental crises, but historically these have been obstacles 
rather than ultimately destabilising events. Amongst its constitutional powers, the House of 
Elders advises the lower house of parliament on shortcomings in the administration of 
government, and holds the mediation capacity of a council of elders. These responsibilities 
have been broadly interpreted by the government and the body itself during the statebuilding 
process, with considerable latitude conceded. These interpretations have resulted in the 
House’s intended role as the mediating influence in Somaliland politics and the state 
formation process. Although this carries problematic implications of its own and the future of 
this role is uncertain,64 on numerous occasions the Upper House has both overtly and subtly 
exercised its responsibility to reconcile between branches of government. It has often 
provided fora in which problems can be addressed and resolved, as well as in some instances 
acting as the referee. In this capacity, the House of Elders acts in a quasi-judicial manner that 
is similar to the historic role of the ad hoc guurti. The body’s overall role in the statebuilding 
process has changed since 1991, and there are complications associated with the House being 
a political actor entrenched in the institution in which it is mediating. However, the continued 
stabilising influence of the elders has thus far outweighed complications. The combination of 
both local and national clan efforts has been instrumental in addressing most physical and 
political conflict as, and often before, it occurs.  
 
63 Bradbury, Becoming, 116; see also Renders, Consider. 





SOMALILAND AND POLITICAL RESILIENCE 
Because of and through these three key areas, the Somaliland clan has been vital to political 
resilience within the Somaliland state and the statebuilding process. The impacts of this 
extend beyond these areas, though, as when the state was weak, absent or violent the clan has 
historically and continues to fill the gaps of provision typically managed by the state.65 In this 
way, these resilience mechanisms are not limited to the institutions of the state, but also act to 
underpin an almost circular relationship between the state and the population in areas that are 
vitally important to maintain socio-political stability and thus the continuation of 
statebuilding.  
 
Undeniably the institutionalised clan body – the House of Elders – is far from the traditional 
guurti, and it is widely acknowledged within Somaliland that the members of the House have 
long been politicised. It is also suspected that the guurti’s inclusion as a government 
institution was not as much to achieve an idealised vision of Somali government but rather 
was payment for the elders’ work during the war and the immediate post-conflict period.66 
Still, by institutionalising the clan within central government, it becomes not only a practical 
but also a symbolic inclusion that transcends many political accusations and suspicions and 
serves a purpose in its own right. Practically, the Upper House is charged with ‘traditional’ 
tasks such as ensuring religious and customary law are upheld and maintaining peace and 
security in the territory. The House is also responsible for mediating and resolving conflict 
within the government. Symbolically, the clan has significant mediation roles, particularly in 
mediating co-existence between the two forms of governance in the territory. Although not 
always a tangible act of mediation, the inclusion of the clan in the central government acts as 
point of reassurance and also as a governance safety net, both for the government and for the 
population. Through the Upper House, the clan and clan governance exist both within and 
above the government, ensuring not only a continuation, or at least invocation, of the 
recognised importance of the clan, but also offering assurances that governance exists despite 
the government. The clan is a central part of both the government and the state. The clan is 
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invested in the state, and because of the nature of the Somaliland statebuilding project, the 
state is rooted and invested in the clan; the two are inextricably entwined.67  
 
As a mechanism of resilience, the clan has been central to ‘holding together’ the project in 
Somaliland. The state, as an unrecognised entity and undertaking self-led and self-styled 
statebuilding, depends upon continued support and legitimacy from the population, and the 
population depends on the state for fulfilling promises of peace and sovereignty. Because of 
the precarious nature of the project, the clan acts as a facilitator and a buffer, mediating, 
negotiating and resolving potential conflicts or conflicting actors, ideas, expectations and 
processes, as well as filling gaps where the state and the government are weak. Symbolically, 
this mechanism acts to provide balance, mediation and reassurance within a rapidly evolving 
socio-political space. In the early stages of statebuilding in Somaliland, the clan and the 
Upper House earned the nickname of the ‘spine’ of Somaliland. Clan mechanisms have 
facilitated facilitates flexibility and adaptability, as well as providing a point of equilibrium 
and a means to return to it.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
It would be inaccurate to claim that the centrality and use of the clan is the only mechanism 
that has contributed to the continuation of statebuilding in Somaliland. The work and 
existence of a multitude of actors, structures and processes have been vital.68 Indeed, the state 
in Somaliland and the processes surrounding its creation and continuation are centred on 
complex and evolving relationships between political processes and society. The success of 
this is underpinned by the fostering of these relationships and the rooting of the state in 
society and society in the state. A point of resilience, therefore, is the continuation of the state 
along the agreed upon lines that have emerged and evolved. In the statebuilding process, the 
clan, as a common denominator between the state and society, has been instrumental in 
establishing and maintaining this. However, there is an inherent fragility within Somaliland’s 
success; fragility found not only within the precariousness of the state in the condition of 
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In Somaliland today, the resilience mechanism of the clan is becoming a pressure point for 
the state’s latent fragility. Much of the influence of the clan is its power in the symbolic 
rather than the practical; the clan has acted as the trusted ‘known’ in an unfamiliar and 
turbulent process of socio-political change. As the state changes, though, so does the power 
of the clan. The placement and role of the clan was never set in stone. Indeed, constitutional 
ambiguity regarding the composition and role of the House of Elders indicates flexibility for 
change as socio-political relationships evolve. As the modern state and democracy become 
more familiar in Somaliland, relationships and expectations are changing, including those 
surrounding the role of the clan. Increasingly the clan’s presence within the government is 
recognised as being overly political and thus incapable of fulfilling the original intent. 
Accusations of corruption and co-option by a powerful executive date back to 1991, but the 
self-extension crisis of 200669 sparked serious concerns about and objection to an unchecked 
powerful body within a modernising government.70 What had been instrumental in balancing 
the demands of governance in the statebuilding process thus poses a threat to the continuation 
of the process. As the process of statebuilding continues the role and placement of the clan – 
both symbolically and practically – must be addressed and resolved in order to prevent the 
institution from unbalancing a system it is tasked with maintaining equilibrium in. 
 
As an unrecognised state, Somaliland has much invested in the maintenance of peace and of a 
stable political apparatus. The quest for statehood is a strong unifying factor within 
Somaliland and the anticipation of recognition facilitates political change and local 
ownership in that change. Importantly, it also promotes resilience. However, because of this 
there is also very little room in Somaliland for error. The resilience of the state, and thus the 
dream of sovereignty, rests upon the not only the maintenance of peace and the continuation 
of the political process, but also upon the maintenance of societal support for the project. 
Engaging not only the Somaliland people but also the familiar and effective clan structures in 
these processes helped to create a system of resilience suited to Somaliland’s particular social 
and political needs during the period of statebuilding. The inherent fragility of Somaliland 
depends upon these structures to uphold and continue the process not only between society 
and the state, but also within the government itself. 
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As the case of Somaliland demonstrates, using the language of resilience to analyse the role 
of socio-political actors and processes that sit within but also outside of formal state 
structures is beneficial in identifying mechanisms that exist within statebuilding but are not 
always recognised. It also highlights the web of intertwined nature of stability and fragility, 
and forces consideration of a symbiotic relationship rather than a spectrum. Of course it 
would be methodologically problematic to draw conclusions from one case to apply to a 
generalised context. However, it remains important to consider individual cases to question, 
or even inform, broader understandings. When considering statebuilding, we often ask 
questions about stability and fragility, but we rarely ask questions about them together. When 
considering statebuilding we must also ask questions about what could make a state 
sustainably stable, and about how those actors and processes can be recognised and 
understood within the process of statebuilding.  These questions naturally guide 
understandings of the process of statebuilding away from a pre-determined end and towards 
an approach that better allows for the flexibility required for statebuilding; it better allows for 
a consideration of individual factors, histories and circumstances that cannot be divorced 
from any form of political change. The conceptual lexicon of resilience incorporates the 
language of flexibility, and bringing that into analysis of politics and specifically of 
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